Since gaining full independence in 1905, Norway has experienced more than a century of democratic elections, and has reformed its electoral system three times, most notably with the switch from a two-round runoff system to proportional representation in 1919. This article introduces a new data set featuring all candidates running for parliamentary (Storting) elections from 1906 to 2013, and document patterns over time and across electoral systems in the development of the party system; candidates' gender, age, occupation, and geographic ties; and voter turnout.
Norway is one of the world's oldest and most stable democracies. Officially, the starting point of modern Norwegian democracy is May 17, 1814, when the Constitution was adopted. The Constitution of 1814 is the now the oldest codified constitution in Europe, and is second globally only to that of the United States (Narud and Strøm 2011) .
Although formally in a union with Sweden from 1814, Norway enjoyed over a hundred years of quasi-independent growth and political development before full independence was declared in 1905. The separation was peaceful, and subsequently approved by a national referendum. A second referendum in 1905 established Norway as a constitutional monarchy.
The first electoral system used for the Norwegian Storting (parliament), introduced by the 1814 Constitution, was based on indirect elections with plurality rule. A limited number of eligible male voters elected delegates to electoral colleges, and these delegates then selected the members of parliament (MPs) (Aardal 2002; Helland and Saglie 2003) .
This system governed 31 elections from 1815 until 1903. A parliamentary system was adopted in 1884, with the King of Sweden losing control over the executive and designation of advisers. Direct electoral contestation for parliamentary seats began in 1906 after the formal separation from Sweden. Since then, Norway has experienced more than a century of democratic elections.
We introduce a new data set of Norwegian parliamentary elections from 1906 to 2013, which we use to document several patterns in the development of democratic representation and voter behavior. The data set is distinctive in three ways. First, it contains candidate-level observations for all candidates from all parties since the 1906 election, making it a rare resource for candidate-level research on elections. Second, it spans one major electoral system reform and two minor reforms. The major reform was the change from a single-member district (SMD) system using a two-round plurality runoff (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) ) to a closed-list proportional representation (PR) system in multi-member districts with the D'Hondt method for allocating seats . In the post-World War II period, the seat allocation method was switched to Modified Sainte-Laguë (1953 -1985 , and later, adjustment seats were also added . Finally, the data set contains information on candidates' gender, age, occupation, and hometown, which provides an opportunity to study the nature and development of democratic representation over time and across the electoral system environments. In what follows, we briefly describe the context and chronology of Norway's four electoral systems, and then use this new data resource to illustrate patterns and changes over time in the party system, candidate and MP characteristics, and voter turnout.
Chronology of the Electoral System, 1906-2013
Aardal (2002) were required to use a decentralized candidate selection process based on local nominating conventions in order to receive public financial support for nomination meetings (Valen, Narud and Skare 2002; Aardal 2011) . Elected MPs who are appointed to cabinet must resign their seats in the Storting, and are replaced by deputy MPs who are either designated on the ballot as such (during the two-round system period) or are the next in line on the party's list (under the PR system). In our presentations of the data, we focus on the MPs who were initially elected, without including deputies who were promoted into permanent seats after the election. Note: Adjustment seats are awarded only to parties that reach an electoral threshold of 4% of the national vote count.
District magnitude does not include adjustment seats. All PR systems are effectively closed-list (see footnote 4). -Round System: 1906 -1918 The two-round runoff system that governed the five elections from 1906 to 1918 worked as follows. In the first round, a candidate was elected if he or she received an absolute majority of votes cast in the district. If a majority was not achieved in the first round, a second round of elections was held within a few weeks. 2 The candidate that obtained a plurality of the votes in the runoff election won the race. In contrast to most other two-round systems, competition in the second round was not limited to a fixed number of candidates, nor was entry in the second round restricted to candidates who ran in the first round. All coordination was thus elite-driven rather than resulting mechanically from the electoral rules (Fiva and Smith 2017 
Two

PR (D'Hondt): 1921-1949
With the expansion of the franchise, support for the socialist Labor Party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti ) increased. In part as a strategy of socialist "containment" similar to the pattern in many other European democracies in the early 20th century (Rokkan 1970; Boix 1999; Blais, Dobrzynska and Indridason 2005) , the non-socialist parties conceded in 1919 to change the electoral system to a PR system. The old single-member districts were grouped into 29 multi-member districts with a median magnitude of 5 seats, and the total number of seats in the Storting increased from 126 to 150. Adjustment seats were introduced in 1989, contributing further to increasing the proportionality of the system. Under this system, seats are allocated in two rounds: first-tier 4 Voters are allowed to change the rank order of the candidates on the party list and to strike out names of candidates they do not want elected. However, for a list to be changed through this process, a majority of a party's voters must alter the list in the exact same way. This has never happened, so the system is effectively a closed-list system.
5 Bergen was a separate district until 1973. Since 2005, district magnitude is determined through a process that takes into account the population and geographical area of each county. As such, sparsely populated but geographically large counties are currently somewhat overrepresented in parliament. Before 2005, there was no direct link between the geographic distribution of seats and district population size (Aardal 2011) .
6 The ability for parties to form electoral cartels was re-introduced in 1985, but abolished before the next election.
seats are allocated at the district level, as before, using the Modified Sainte-Laguë method; then, second-tier adjustment seats are given to parties that are underrepresented nationally after the first-tier seats have been allocated, provided that those parties reach an electoral threshold of 4% of the national vote count. 
Data Sources and Variables
The level of observation in the data set is each individual candidacy in each election year, for a total of 60,744 candidate-year observations. The data were hand-collected from various volumes of Stortingsvalget (Parliamentary Elections) published by Statistics Norway.
These documents only list the full names of all candidates from 1961 onwards. Prior to the 1961 election, only the initial of the first name is provided for male candidates, while the full name is provided for female candidates. We manually supplemented male first names for many of the candidates in the 1906 to 1957 period using biographical information from the Archive of Politicians (elected MPs) provided by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD), later electoral lists, and other sources, and then standardized the format and spelling of individuals' names across observations. We classified candidates' gender based on first names. Year of birth for elected MPs also comes from the Archive of Politicians.
For the two-round runoff period, the data set includes both rounds, so the variable structure is somewhat different from the PR period. For the PR period, candidate observations are hierarchically grouped into their respective parties for each district in each election. In the two-round runoff period, a ballot would typically include the name of the Storting candidate, the name of his deputy candidate, and both of their occupations.
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After PR was introduced, ballots displayed the party label and the ranking of candidates, and typically also included candidates' occupation and hometown.
We classify candidates' first and second (if applicable) occupations based on two-digit ISCO-08 codes (International Standard Classification of Occupations).
8 In addition, we establish seven codes for occupations that do not fit into the ISCO framework (owners, pensioners, housewives, students, self-employed, unemployed, and other dependents).
The practice of listing occupations has become less common over time. In the 2013 election, only 9.5% of our observations include the candidate's occupation.
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Information on each candidate's municipality of residence allows us to identify his or her geographic ties to the constituency. The data set includes a municipality identifier that corresponds to the municipality codes (kommunenummer ) used in official government statistics; hence, it is straightforward to merge our candidate-level data set with any municipality-level data set from, for example, Statistics Norway.
The full set of variables in the data set includes standard electoral variables such as year, district, region, magnitude, electorate, party, total votes, valid votes, turnout, size of parliament, seat outcomes, and electoral pacts, as well as candidate-level variables for vote share or list rank, gender, age (for MPs only), hometown, and occupation.
Evolution of Representation and Turnout
In the remainder of this article, we survey the development of the Norwegian party system, candidates' demographic, occupational, and geographic backgrounds, and voter turnout across the four electoral systems covered by the data set. In so doing, we paint a broad picture of how Norwegian democracy has developed over time, and how changes in the electoral system are reflected in our data.
The Party System
The first formal parties were established in 1884 (Aardal 2002) . At the time our data set commences in 1906, the party system was still in a state of flux following the disso- 
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Gallagher's Index of Disproportionality
Note: This figure shows the development of the Effective Number of Parties and Gallagher's Index of Disproportionality over the 1906 to 2013 period. Roman numerals indicate electoral system eras (see Table 1 ).
ipation of the electoral system's mechanical constraints (Duverger 1954; Cox 1997 After adjustment seats were introduced in 1989, the effective number of parties increased and the disproportionality of the seat allocation fell slightly. In the most recent election in 2013, the index of disproportionality was 2.8.
Demographic Backgrounds of Candidates and MPs
The representation of women has increased dramatically in the past few decades, and 
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Note: The top-panel figure shows the fraction of female candidates (white) and elected MPs (black), by election year.
The bottom-panel displays the average age (in years) of elected MPs, by election year. The vertical dashed lines indicate electoral reforms. Roman numerals indicate electoral system eras (see Table 1 ).
The top panel of Figure 
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The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the development in average MP age over time.
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For the first half of our sample period, the average age fluctuated around 52 years. 12 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making/index_en.htm. 13 We do not have non-elected candidates' age because this information is not listed on the ballot. MPs' age is collected from the Archive of Politicians data set at NSD.
Occupational Backgrounds of Candidates and MPs
With our data, we are also able to explore the development of candidates' occupations over time, which provides some insight into the parties' personnel strategies and bases of support. Existing research suggests that electoral rules might also influence the nature of representation through the selection of candidates of different occupational and class backgrounds. For example, Becher (2016) suggests that leftist parties have more incentives to nominate less extreme candidates in majoritarian compared to proportional electoral systems-as a result, one might expect to find more candidates selected from traditional support organizations, such as labor unions, in leftist parties under PR. show a steady increase in professionals (e.g., lawyers, doctors, teachers) and a decrease in agricultural and fishery workers (in most cases, this occupational category captures candidates whose occupation is "farmer"); however, it is important to remember that the availability of the occupation information drops off precipitously in electoral system era (IV). Figure 4 illustrates the same development, but with four broad categories: whitecollar workers (ISCO codes 1-5; i.e., top five panels of Figure 3 ), farmers (ISCO code 6; i.e., bottom left panel of Figure 3 ), blue-collar workers (ISCO codes 7-9; i.e., bottom middle panels of Figure 3 ) and a residual other category. One of the "other occupations" that has varied over time is husmor (housewife). Many early female candidates listed this as their occupation. Later generations of women had professional careers outside the home before running for office. 
Candidates Elected MPs
Note: The figure shows the fraction of candidates (white) and elected MPs (black) belonging to each occupation category.
We create the occupation dummies by using candidates' first listed occupation (if more than one occupation is listed) in the first year the candidate is running. Candidates with no occupation listed on the ballot in the first election are excluded.
unions after the reform. However, the descriptive representation of such occupations did not increase, which suggests that many of these candidates were low on the party list. Future research might look into parties' candidate selection strategies in more detail under the different electoral rules. .4
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Note: The figure shows the fraction of candidates (white) and elected MPs (black) from municipalities with "town" status, by election year. The figure also plots the fraction of the population who lived in towns (grey). The vertical dashed lines indicate electoral reforms. Roman numerals indicate electoral system eras (see Table 1 ). Hometown information is not available for the 1906 election. For the remaining years we have hometown information for 98.3 percent of the observations.
Municipality identifiers based on the given hometowns of candidates allow us to pin down which municipalities over time would be designated by the government as being an urban "town." Figure 5 illustrates the fraction of candidates (white) and elected MPs .4 1 9 0 6 1 9 0 9 1 9 1 2 1 9 1 5 1 9 1 8 1 9 2 1 1 9 2 4 1 9 2 7 1 9 3 0 1 9 3 3 1 9 3 6 1 9 4 5 1 9 4 9 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 7 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 3
Candidates Elected MPs
Note: The figure shows the fraction of candidates (white) and elected MPs (black) running for office outside their home electoral district by election year. The vertical dashed lines indicate electoral reforms. Roman numerals indicate electoral system eras (see Table 1 ). Hometown information is not available for the 1906 election. For the remaining years we have hometown information for 98.3 percent of the observations. Figure 6 shows the proportion of candidates (and elected MPs) who ran outside of the district containing their hometown-in other words, "parachute" candidates. As such candidacies were initially allowed only for current and former cabinet ministers, 
Voter Turnout
Finally, the data set can be used to evaluate district-level patterns in voter turnout over time and across electoral systems. Existing research has noted that mean turnout tends to be higher under PR systems, and cross-district variance tends to be lower (e.g. , Cox 1999; Selb 2009; Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey 2014; Eggers 2015; Cox, Fiva and Smith 2016) . Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of voter turnout in the 29 elections included in the data. 15 In the beginning of the 20th century, the average cross-district turnout was about 60%. Average turnout increased with the introduction of PR, but the effect was modest. Figure 7 shows, however, a dramatic decrease in the cross-district variance of the voter turnout distribution that coincides with the introduction of PR. Using a panel based on the pre-reform district structure, Cox, Fiva and Smith (2016) document this "contraction effect" in more detail.
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Voter turnout remained at a high level throughout the rest of the period covered by the data set. In electoral system era (III), turnout was consistently around or above 80%, while it has been somewhat lower in electoral system era (IV). It is unclear whether this decrease is related to the introduction of adjustment seats or whether it is symptomatic of a general pattern across many democracies. The variance of the voter turnout distribution has been remarkably low since adjustment seats were introduced in 1989. Beyond the general patterns presented here, the new data set introduced in this article opens up several avenues for future research. First, having data on all candidates running for office (not just winners) makes it possible to study the consequences of different types of candidates on political representation. Fiva and Smith (2016) , for example, use a regression discontinuity design to pin down the causal effect of incumbency on the formation of dynasties in Norway, taking advantage of narrow electoral margins for specific candidates. Similar designs could be used to explore whether the election of specific types of candidates-such as women or those with local ties to an area-has any effect on voter behavior or policy outcomes.
Another useful feature of the data set is that it covers multiple electoral reforms, something which allows researchers to study the properties and consequences of different electoral systems in an otherwise stable (single-country) environment. But given that many other European democracies concurrently adopted PR in the early 1900s (Rokkan 1970; Boix 1999; Blais, Dobrzynska and Indridason 2005) , and the other Scandinavian democracies also later made the switch to Modified Sainte-Laguë (Elklit 1999) , the data set also presents promising opportunities for comparative research. Finally, the long time frame covered by the data set allows researchers to investigate the evolution of democratic representation during a dramatic period of growth in Norwegian history. While GDP per capita in the United States was 4.9 times larger in 2010 than in 1930, Norway's was 6.2 times the 1930 level (Barth, Moene and Willumsen 2014) .
Scholars interested in using this new and remarkably detailed candidate-level data set can gain access to it through the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD):
www.nsd.uib.no/english/.
